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Abstract
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who are aware of how decisions are being made. We study a framework in which this
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1. Introduction
In various situations an agent receives an allocation based on some prediction about her
characteristics—a prediction that relies on data generated by the agent’s own behavior.
Firms use a consumer’s web browsing history for price discrimination or ad targeting; a
prospective borrower’s loan decision and interest rate depend on her credit score; and web
search rankings take as input a web site’s own text and metadata. In all these settings, agents
who understand the prediction algorithm can alter their behavior to receive a more desirable
allocation. Consumers can adjust browsing behavior to mimic those with low willingness to
pay; borrowers can open or close various accounts to improve their credit score; and web sites
can engage in search engine optimization to improve their rankings. How should a designer
account for data manipulation when setting the allocation rule?
First consider a naive designer, one who is unaware of the potential for manipulation.
Before implementing an allocation rule, the designer gathers data about agents and fits a
model to estimate agents’ types (i.e., the relevant characteristics) from observables. The
naive allocation rule then assigns each agent the allocation that is optimal according to this
estimate of her type. But after the rule is implemented, agents’ behavior changes: if agents
with “higher observables” x receive a “higher allocation” y under the allocation rule Y (x),
and if agents prefer higher allocations, then some agents will find ways to game the rule by
increasing their x. In line with Goodhart’s Law, the original estimation is no longer accurate.
A more sophisticated designer would realize that agent behavior had changed, and could
gather new data and then re-estimate the relationship between observables and type. After
the designer updates the allocation rule based on the new prediction, agent behavior would
of course change once again. The designer could iterate until finding a fixed point : an
allocation rule that is a best response to the data that is generated under this very rule. But
the resulting allocation need not match the desired agent characteristics very well.
The question of this paper is how a designer with commitment power—a Stackelberg
leader—should adjust a fixed-point allocation rule in order to improve the accuracy of the
allocation. We find that a designer should commit to making the allocation rule less sensitive
to manipulable data than under the fixed point. In other words, the designer should “flatten”
the allocation rule. Flattening the allocation rule results in “ex-post” suboptimality in the
sense that an agent’s allocation will generally not be optimal given the information the
designer obtains about her type. By contrast, fixed-point allocations are ex-post optimal.
However, a flatter allocation rule reduces agent incentives for manipulation, which makes
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the data more informative about the agent’s type. Allocation accuracy improves on balance.
We develop and explore this logic in what we believe is a compelling and canonical model of
information loss due to manipulation.
By way of background, note that in some environments there are fixed-point rules that
actually deliver the designer’s full-information outcome. We can think of a fixed-point rule
as corresponding to the designer’s equilibrium strategy in a signaling game in which the
designer and agent best respond to each other. Under a standard single-crossing condition à
la Spence (1973)—the designer wants to give more desirable allocations to agents with higher
types, and higher types have lower marginal costs of taking higher observable actions—this
signaling game has a fully separating equilibrium, i.e., one in which the designer perfectly
matches the agent’s allocation to her type.
We are interested in settings in which the agent’s manipulation leads to information
loss. We build on the general framework of “muddled information” (Frankel and Kartik,
2019), specifically the linear-quadratic model introduced in Fischer and Verrecchia (2000) and
Bénabou and Tirole (2006); see also Ali and Bénabou (2019), Gesche (2019), Ball (2019), and,
outside the linear-quadratic class, Hu, Immorlica, and Vaughan (2019). In this framework,
single-crossing fails because agents have a two-dimensional type. The dimension of interest
to the designer is the agent’s natural action η ∈ R, which determines her observable x ∈ R
prior to any manipulation. Agents are also heterogeneous in their gaming ability, γ ∈ R,
which summarizes how much they adjust their action in response to incentives: gaming
ability may represent marginal costs of altering one’s observable, or marginal benefits of
improving one’s allocation. In this framework, we consider a designer who seeks to minimize
quadratic loss between an agent’s allocation y ∈ R and the natural action η. We restrict
attention to linear allocation rules or policies Y (x) = βx + β0, and we posit that agents
adjust their observable x in proportion to γβ, i.e., their gaming ability times the sensitivity
of allocations to observables.1
Our main result establishes that in this environment the optimal policy is less sensitive
to observables than is the fixed-point policy. Mathematically, for allocation rules Y (x) =
βx + β0, the designer flattens the fixed-point rule by attenuating the coefficient β towards
zero. For instance, suppose the sensitivity of the naive policy is β = 1: when the designer
does not condition the allocation on observables, the linear regression coefficient of type
η on observable x is 1, and the naive designer responds by matching her allocation rule’s
1Subsection 2.1 points out that such behavior for the agents can be microfounded. Subsection 4.1
discusses the optimality of linear allocation rules.
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sensitivity to this regression coefficient. The fixed-point policy may have β = 0.7. That is,
when the designer sets β = 0.7 and runs a linear regression of η on x (using data generated
by the agent in response to β = 0.7), the regression coefficient is the same 0.7. Our result
is that the optimal policy has β ∈ (0, 0.7), say β = 0.6. Note that the designer recognizes
and commits to ex-post misallocations under this optimal policy: after the designer sets
β = 0.6, the corresponding linear regression coefficient could be ' 0.75. We emphasize that
our argument for shrinking regression coefficients is driven by the informational benefit from
reduced manipulation, and in turn, the resulting improvement in allocations. It is orthogonal
to concerns about model overfitting.
In comparing our commitment solution with the fixed-point benchmark, it is helpful to
keep in mind two distinct interpretations of the fixed point. The first concerns a designer
who has market power in the sense that agents adjust their manipulation behavior in re-
sponse to this designer’s policies. Think of web sites engaging in search engine optimization
to specifically improve their Google rankings; third party sellers paying for fake reviews on
the Amazon platform; or citizens trying to game an eligibility rule for a targeted govern-
ment policy. In these cases the designer may settle on a fixed point by iterating policies
until reaching an ex post optimum. Our paper highlights that this fixed point may yet be
suboptimal ex ante, and offers the prescriptive advice of flattening the allocation rule.
A second perspective is that the fixed-point policy represents the outcome of a compet-
itive market. With many banks, any one bank that uses credit information in an ex-post
suboptimal manner will simply be putting itself at a disadvantage to its competitors. So the
fixed point becomes a descriptive prediction of the market outcome, i.e., the equilibrium of
a signaling game. In that case, the optimal policy we derive may suggest a proposal for a
government intervention to improve market allocations, or it may suggest the direction that
firms would move in if they could collude.
Related Literature. At a very broad level, our flattening result is reminiscent of the
“downward distortion” of allocations in screening problems following Mussa and Rosen (1978).
That said, our framework, analysis, and emphasis—on manipulation and information loss,
allocation accuracy, contrasting commitment with fixed points—are not readily comparable
with most of that literature.
One paper on screening we would highlight is Bonatti and Cisternas (2019), although
their model is still quite different from ours. They study a price discrimination problem in
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which a designer with access to a long-lived consumer’s purchase history chooses what to
reveal to a sequence of short-lived firms. They find that firms get better information about
consumer types, and hence higher steady-state profits, if the designer reveals a statistic
that underweights recent consumer behavior. Suitable underweighting dampens consumer
incentives to manipulate demand.
There is a literature in finance concerning the difficulty of using financial activity to
learn fundamentals when market participants have incentives to manipulate such learning.
Although these models are again very different from ours, some papers highlight, as we do,
the benefits of commitments to “underutilizing information”.2 See, for example, Bond and
Goldstein (2015) and Boleslavsky, Kelly, and Taylor (2017). These authors study models
of trading in financial markets when there is a policymaker who, upon observing prices
and/or order flows, can intervene in the market. A common theme is that the anticipation
of intervention can affect market participants’ behavior in a manner that makes the financial
market less informative about a fundamental to which the policymaker would like to tailor
her intervention. Both papers establish that the policymaker may benefit from a commitment
that, in some sense, entails ex-post underutilization of information in order to improve the
market’s informativeness. In particular, Bond and Goldstein (2015, Proposition 2) highlight
a local first-order information benefit vs. second-order allocation loss akin to our Lemma 1.
Unlike us, they do not study global optimality.
The motivation underlying our work also relates to that of other economists who have stud-
ied the design of testing regimes and other instruments to improve information extraction.
Harbaugh and Rasmusen (2018) show how a test that pools together certain realizations may
yield more information than a fully informative test if agents who expected bad outcomes on
the fully informative test would choose not to participate. Perez-Richet and Skreta (2018)
study how a principal may benefit from a noisy test when the agent can manipulate the test
and the principal’s allocation best responds to the agent’s manipulation. Martinez-Gorricho
and Oyarzun (2019) find conditions under which a designer concerned with manipulation
should commit to a “conservative” (or “confirmatory”) threshold for overturning an agent’s
default allocation.3 Jann and Schottmüller (2018), Ali and Bénabou (2019), and Frankel
and Kartik (2019) analyze strategic environments in which hiding information about agents’
2Less directly related, Duffie and Dworczak (2018) design financial benchmarks to be robust to the
incentives of traders to distort these benchmarks; Zhang’s (2019) related work explores the susceptibility of
financial derivatives to price manipulation.
3Conservatism has also been advocated to mitigate distortions in other contexts (e.g., Li, 2001).
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actions—increasing their privacy—can improve an observer’s information about the agents’
characteristics.4 In this vein, Ball (2019) considers an environment with multidimensional
actions and proposes that an intermediary should add more noise to the more manipulable
dimensions of agents’ actions.
Finally, our paper connects to a recent computer science literature studying how a designer
with commitment power should set up a classification algorithm in the presence of strategic
manipulation, and the welfare effects of the designer’s policy. See, among others, Hardt,
Megiddo, Papadimitriou, and Wootters (2016), Hu et al. (2019), Milli, Miller, Dragan, and
Hardt (2018), and Kleinberg and Raghavan (2019). Note that, in contrast to the latter paper,
we are only concerned with “gaming” by agents; we do not model an agent’s effort as either
producing desirable output or intrinsically affecting the agent’s optimal allocation. Moreover,
our designer’s objective only values the accuracy of the allocations, and not (directly) agents’
costs of manipulation. In a binary strategic classification problem, Braverman and Garg
(2019) discuss the role of random allocations in not only improving allocation accuracy but
also reducing manipulation costs.5
2. Model
The agent has a type (η, γ) ∈ R2 drawn from some joint distribution F . It may be
helpful to remember the mnemonics η for natural action, and γ for gaming ability; see
Subsection 2.1. Assume the variances Var(η) = σ2η and Var(γ) = σ2γ are positive and finite.6
Denote the means of η and γ by µη, µγ, and assume their correlation is ρ ∈ (−1, 1), with
ρ = Cov(η, γ)/(σησγ).
The designer seeks to match an allocation y ∈ R to η, with a quadratic loss of (y − η)2.
The designer chooses y = Y (x) as a function of an observed action x ∈ R that is chosen by
the agent. Thus, the designer’s welfare loss is
Welfare Loss ≡ E[(Y (x)− η)2]. (1)
The agent chooses x as a function of her type (η, γ) after observing the designer’s allocation
4Eliaz and Spiegler (2019) explore the distinct question of whether an agent has incentives to reveal her
own data to a “non-Bayesian statistician” who is making predictions about her.
5 In the economics literature, Ederer, Holden, and Meyer (2018) study randomized rewards scheme to
reduce gaming in a multi-tasking environment. Their focus is on improving effort rather than information.
6Throughout, we use ‘positive’ without qualification to mean ‘strictly positive’, and similarly for ‘nega-
tive’, ‘larger’, and ‘smaller’.
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rule Y . In a manner detailed later, the agent will have an incentive to choose a higher x to
obtain a higher y. Given a strategy of the agent, the designer can compute the distribution
of x and the value of E[η|x] for any x the agent may choose. A standard decomposition7 is
Welfare Loss = E[(E[η|x]− η)2]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Info loss of estimating η from x
+ E[(Y (x)− E[η|x])2]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Misallocation loss given estimation
. (2)
Plainly, holding fixed the agent’s strategy, it is “ex-post optimal” for the designer to set
Y (x) = E[η|x]. However, the agent’s strategy responds to Y . So it is possible that the
designer may prefer to use an ex-post suboptimal allocation rule because that improves her
ability to estimate η from x, as seen in the first term of (2). That is, the designer may
benefit from the power to commit to her allocation rule.
2.1. Linearity Assumptions
Assume the designer restricts attention to linear allocation rules: the designer chooses
policy parameters (β, β0) ∈ R2 such that
Y (x) = βx+ β0. (3)
Also assume that, given the designer’s policy (β, β0), the agent chooses x according to a
linear strategy Xβ(η, γ) that takes the form
Xβ(η, γ) = η +mβγ (4)
for some given parameter m > 0. Thus η is the agent’s “natural action”: the action that
would be taken when the designer’s policy does not depend on x (i.e., β = 0). The variable γ
represents idiosyncratic responsiveness to the designer’s policy: agents with higher γ increase
their action from their natural level by more for any β > 0. The parameter m captures a
common component of responsiveness across all agents.
7The right-hand sides of (1) and (2) are equal if
E[(Y (x))2 − 2ηY (x) + η2] = E[η2 − 2ηE[η|x] + (E[η|x])2 + (Y (x))2 − 2Y (x)E[η|x] + (E[η|x])2].
Canceling out like terms and rearranging, it suffices to show that
2E
[
(E[η|x]− η)Y (x)] = 2E[(E[η|x]− η)E[η|x]].
This equality holds by the orthogonality condition E[(E[η|x]− η)g(x)] = 0 for all functions g(x).
6
The strategy in Equation 4 can be motivated as the best response for an agent who
maximizes a utility of
mγy − (x− η)2/2.
Here m captures the “stakes” that agents face to obtain higher y, and γ is an idiosyncratic
marginal benefit. Alternatively, the strategy is also optimal for an agent with γ > 0 who
maximizes
y − (x− η)2/(2mγ).
Here m parameterizes the “manipulability” of the action x, and γ is an agent’s idiosyncratic
“gaming ability”.
2.2. The Designer’s Problem
We study a setting in which the designer commits to her policy (β, β0), which the agent
observes and responds to according to (4). Plugging the rule (3) and the strategy (4) into
the welfare loss function (1) yields
Welfare Loss = E[(β(η +mβγ) + β0 − η)2].
The designer’s problem is therefore to choose (β, β0) to minimize the above loss function,
which is quartic in β.8 We denote the solution as (β∗, β∗0).
2.3. Discussion
Given the asymmetry between the characteristics η and γ in the agent’s strategy (4), it
is crucial for our results that the designer seeks to match her allocation with η rather than
γ. The reason is that when the designer’s policy puts more weight on the data—i.e., when
β increases—the agent’s action x becomes less informative about η but more informative
about γ; Remark 1 below makes this point precise.
It is, on the other hand, straightforward to generalize our analysis to the allocation match-
ing some other characteristic of the agent, τ , that is correlated with η. The assumption we
would require is that E[τ |η] is independent of γ and linear in η. The welfare loss E[(Y (x)−τ)2]
8Using standard mean-variance decompositions, some algebra shows that
Welfare Loss = (1− β)2σ2η +m2β4σ2γ − 2(1− β)mβ2ρσησγ + (β0 − (1− β)µη +mβ2µγ)2.
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could be decomposed as E[(Y (x)−E[τ |η])2]+E[(E[τ |η]−τ)2]. As the second term here—the
information loss in predicting τ from η—is independent of the allocation rule Y (x), it would
not affect the designer’s choice of Y (x). The designer would effectively be trying to match
the allocation to (a linear function of) η.
2.4. Preliminaries
2.4.1. Linear regression of type η on action x
When the designer uses a policy (β˜, β˜0), the agent responds with the strategy Xβ˜(η, γ) =
η+mβ˜γ. Suppose the designer were to gather data under this agent behavior and then esti-
mate the relationship between the type dimension of interest η and the action x. Specifically,
let ηˆβ˜(x) denote the best linear estimator of η from x under a quadratic loss objective:
ηˆβ˜(x) ≡ βˆ(β˜)x+ βˆ0(β˜),
with βˆ and βˆ0 the coefficients of an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of η on x.
Following standard results for OLS,
βˆ(β˜) =
σ2η +mρσησγβ˜
σ2η +m
2σ2γβ˜
2 + 2mρσησγβ˜
, (5)
where the right-hand side’s numerator is the covariance of x and η given the strategy Xβ˜,
and its denominator is the variance of x.9 Correspondingly,
βˆ0(β˜) = µη − βˆ(β˜)[µη +mβ˜µγ].
It is useful to further rewrite the welfare loss (2) as follows, for any policy (β, β0) defining
the linear allocation rule Y (x) = βx+ β0:10
Welfare Loss = E[(ηˆβ(x)− η)2]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Info loss of linearly estimating η from x
+ E[(Y (x)− ηˆβ(x))2]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Misallocation loss given linear estimation
. (6)
Some readers may find it helpful to note that information loss (the first term in (6)) is the
9Our maintained assumption of ρ ∈ (−1, 1) ensures the denominator is non-zero.
10This derivation is identical to that in fn. 7, only replacing E[η|x] by ηˆβ(x) and applying the orthogonality
condition E[(ηˆβ(x)− η)g(x)] = 0 for all affine functions g(x).
8
variance of the residuals in an OLS regression of η on x; put differently, E[(ηˆβ(x) − η)2] =
σ2η(1−R2xη), where R2xη is the coefficient of determination in that regression. It bears emphasis
that Equation 6 is simply a welfare decomposition for any linear allocation rule, which will aid
our interpretation and intuition; the appearance of OLS here does not impose any additional
restriction on the designer.
Remark 1. For ρ ≥ 0, βˆ(β˜) is decreasing on β˜ ≥ 0. To see why, notice that when β˜ increases
the agent’s action x depends more on the variable γ. This increases Var(x) and, when ρ ≥ 0,
also provides the designer with less information about the variable η that she is trying to
estimate from x.11 Both effects lead to a lower βˆ. By contrast, if the designer were trying
to estimate γ rather than η (i.e., minimizing E[(y − γ)2] rather than E[(y − η)2]), then for
ρ ≥ 0, the analogous regression coefficient of γ on x would be increasing on β˜ ≥ 0.
2.4.2. Benchmark policies
Constant. A rule that does not condition the allocation on the observable corresponds
to a constant policy (β, β0) with β = 0. A constant policy gives rise to a welfare loss
of σ2η + (β0 − µη)2. In the decomposition of Equation 6, the entire welfare loss is due to
misallocation; the information loss is zero because the agent’s behavior x = η fully reveals
the natural action η. Under the constant policy the linear estimator ηˆ0 has coefficients
βˆ(0) = 1 and βˆ0(0) = 0.
Naive. Consider a designer who gathers data on the relationship between η and x produced
by agents responding to a constant policy. Suppose further that the designer fails to account
for manipulation, expecting agents to maintain the strategy X0(η, γ) = η regardless of the
policy (β, β0). Then the designer would (incorrectly) perceive her optimal policy to be
(βn, βn0 ) ≡ (βˆ(0), βˆ0(0)) = (1, 0).
Designer’s best response. More generally, suppose the designer expects the agent to use
the strategy Xβ˜(η, γ) = η + mβ˜γ regardless of the policy (β, β0). The designer would find
it optimal in response to set an allocation rule Y (x) equal to the best linear estimator of η
from x, i.e., a policy (βˆ(β˜), βˆ0(β˜)) yielding Y (x) = ηˆβ˜(x).
11Less information is not generally in the Blackwell (1951) sense unless the prior on (η, γ) is bivariate
normal. Rather, it is in the sense of a higher information loss of linearly estimating η from x: E[(ηˆβ˜(x)−η)2]
is increasing in β˜.
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Fixed point. We say that a policy (βfp, βfp0 ) is a fixed point if
βfp = βˆ(βfp) and βfp0 = βˆ0(β
fp).
A fixed point corresponds to a Nash equilibrium of a game in which the designer’s policy
is set simultaneously with the agent’s strategy. That is, instead of the designer committing
to a policy (the Stackelberg solution), the policy is a best response to the agent’s strategy
that the policy induces. In the decomposition of Equation 6, a fixed-point policy may have
a positive information loss, but it has zero misallocation loss—the designer is choosing the
optimal policy given the information that she has.
As elaborated in Subsection 4.1, an elliptical prior distribution F (subsuming normal
distributions) ensures that fixed points also correspond to equilibria of a signaling game
in which the agent first chooses her observable action x and the designer then chooses the
allocation y.
Figure 1 illustrates some designer best response functions and fixed points.
3. Analysis
3.1. Main Result
We seek to compare the designer’s optimal policy (β∗, β∗0) with the fixed points (βfp, β
fp
0 ).
There can, in general, be multiple fixed points, but there is always at least one with a positive
sensitivity or weight on the agent’s action, i.e., βfp > 0. Moreover, when there is nonnegative
correlation in the agent’s characteristics (i.e., ρ ≥ 0), there is only one nonnegative fixed
point, and it satisfies βfp ∈ (0, 1). See Proposition A.1 in the Appendix.
Take any fixed-point sensitivity βfp > 0. Our main result is that the optimal policy puts
less weight on the agent’s action than does the fixed point:
Proposition 1. There is a unique optimum, (β∗, β∗0). It has β∗ > 0 and β∗ < βfp for any
fixed point βfp > 0.
Here is the intuition, as illustrated graphically in Figure 2. Consider the designer choosing
β = βfp > 0. At this point the designer’s policy is ex-post optimal in the sense that the loss
from misallocation (the second term in the welfare decomposition Equation 6) is minimized
at zero. Adjusting the sensitivity β in either direction from βfp leads to an increase in
10
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(a) Parameters: ση = σγ = 1 and m = 1.
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(b) Parameters: ση = σγ = 1 and m = 0.24.
Figure 1 – The best response function βˆ. As shown in Figure 1a, βˆ is decreasing on
[0,∞) when ρ ≥ 0. Figure 1b illustrates that this need not be true when ρ < 0. In all
cases, intersections of βˆ with β correspond to fixed points βfp.
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misallocation loss, but this harm is second order because we are starting from a minimum.
On the other hand, at βfp there is a positive information loss (the first term in (6)) because
x does not reveal η. As suggested by Remark 1, lowering β reduces information loss, which
yields a first-order benefit. While Remark 1 was restricted to ρ ≥ 0, it turns out that the
first-order improvement intuition is general. Hence, on net, there is a first-order welfare
benefit of lowering β from βfp. Of course, the designer wouldn’t lower β all the way down to
0, since making some use of the information from the data is better than not using it at all.12
To complete the proof of Proposition 1, we establish uniqueness of the global optimum, rule
out that it is negative, show that it is less than every fixed point βfp > 0.
To formalize the key step of the proof, which establishes a first-order benefit in reducing
β from any βfp, let L(β) be the welfare loss from choosing policy β, with derivative L′(β).13
Lemma 1. For any βfp, it holds that L′(βfp) > 0.
Note that Lemma 1 also applies to negative values of βfp when those exist.
Remark 2. The welfare gains from commitment can be substantial. For suitable parame-
ters, the welfare in the unique fixed point is arbitrarily close to that of the constant policy
Y (x) = µη, while the welfare under commitment is arbitrarily close to that of the first best.14
3.2. Comparative Statics
We provide a few comparative statics below. In taking comparative statics, it is helpful to
observe that the designer’s best response βˆ(β) defined in Equation 5 depends on parameters
m, ση, and σγ only through the statistic k ≡ mσγ/ση, as does the welfare loss L(β) divided
by σ2η (see Equation A.2 in Appendix A.2). Therefore, the optimal and fixed-point values
β∗ and βfp also only depend on these parameters through k. The parameter k summarizes
the susceptibility of the allocation problem to manipulation: higher k (arising from higher
stakes or manipulability m of the mechanism, greater variance in gaming ability σ2γ, or
lower variance in natural actions σ2η) means that under any fixed policy, agents as a whole
12 Indeed, any fixed-point policy itself does better than the best constant policy (β, β0) = (0, µη). Note,
however, that this constant policy can be better than the naive policy (βn, βn0 ) = (1, 0).
13We write L(β) rather than L(β, β0) because for any β there is uniquely optimal β0 that can be substi-
tuted in; see the proof of Proposition 1, which also confirms that L(·) is differentiable.
14The parameters are such that mσγ/ση → 1/4+ and correlation ρ → −1. Note that both the first-best
welfare and that under the constant policy are independent of ρ; the former is 0 (by normalization) while
the latter is −σ2η, which can be arbitrarily low.
12
Misallocation
loss
Info loss
Total loss
0 βfpβ* βn=1 β
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
Losses
Figure 2 – The welfare loss decomposition from Equation 6 for policy (β0, β), with the
optimal β0 plugged in for each β on the horizontal axis. Parameters: ση = σγ = ρ = 1
and m = 1. Numerical solutions: β∗ = 0.590 and βfp = 0.682.
adjust their observable action x further from their natural action η, relative to the spread of
observables prior to manipulation. Hence, for comparative statics over model primitives, it
is sufficient to consider only the statistic k and the correlation parameter ρ.
Proposition 2. For k ≡ mσγ/ση, the following comparative statics hold.
1. As k →∞, β∗ → 0; as k → 0, β∗ → 1. If ρ ≥ 0, then β∗ is strictly decreasing in k; if
ρ < 0, then β∗ is strictly quasi-concave in k, attaining a maximum at some point.
2. β∗ is strictly increasing in ρ when k > 3/4, strictly decreasing in ρ when k < 3/4, and
independent of ρ when k = 3/4.
3. When ρ = 0, β∗/βfp is strictly decreasing in k, approaching 3
√
1/2 ≈ 0.79 as k → ∞
and 1 as k → 0.
Part 1 of the proposition implies that when agents’ characteristics are nonnegatively
correlated, a designer faced with a more manipulable environment should put less weight
on the agents’ observable action. While such monotonicity is intuitive, it does not hold
when there is negative correlation. Similarly, one might expect greater positive correlation
to increase the optimum β∗; indeed, Frankel and Kartik (2019, Proposition 4) establish that
13
it does have this effect on the (unique) positive fixed point βfp > 0. But we see in part 2 of
Proposition 2 that this holds for β∗ only when the susceptibility-to-manipulation statistic k
is large enough. Finally, part 3 implies that when the characteristics are uncorrelated, the
ratio βfp/β∗ decreases as the statistic k increases. As k → 0, the fixed point fully reveals
an agent’s natural action (βfp → 1) and so the designer does not benefit from commitment
power: the fixed point is optimal as it provides the minimum possible welfare loss. As
k →∞, both β∗ and βfp tend to zero yet the ratio β∗/βfp stays bounded.
4. Discussion
4.1. Nonlinear Policies
As explained in Subsection 2.1, there are reasonable objective functions under which it is
optimal for the agent to use a linear strategy of the form (4) when the designer uses a linear
allocation rule of the form (3). That the designer uses linear allocation rules is, however,
generally restrictive. Fischer and Verrecchia (2000), Bénabou and Tirole (2006), Gesche
(2019), and Frankel and Kartik (2019) have shown that fixing any linear strategy for the
agent, the designer’s best response is also linear if the agent’s type distribution is bivariate
elliptical (Gómez, Gómez-Villegas, and Marín, 2003), subsuming bivariate normal. Hence,
under these joint distributions, the linear fixed-point policies of the current paper correspond
to equilibrium response functions in a signaling game. Ball (2019) extends these results to
a multidimensional action space. A plausible conjecture is that elliptical distributions also
ensure global optimality of linear allocation rules when the designer has commitment power.
4.2. Alternative Models of Information loss
The fundamental logic underlying our main result is simply that “flattening” the allocation
rule from any fixed point yields a first-order improvement in information while only a second-
order loss from misallocation. We have developed this point in what we believe is a canonical
model of information loss from manipulation, one used in a number of aforementioned papers.
But we think the point applies more broadly, including in other models of information loss.
For instance, even a model with a one-dimensional type (such as the model in this paper
with no heterogeneity on the gaming ability γ) can lead to information loss when there is
a bounded action space and strong manipulation incentives. The reason is pooling “at the
top”. We establish in Appendix B a version of our result for a simple model in this vein.
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4.3. General Allocation Problems
We conclude by sketching a proposal for attenuating the impact of manipulable data
in more general allocation problems. We have in mind an abstract environment in which
a designer estimates an agent’s characteristic η from the observation of some x, and then
assigns an allocation y based on both x and the estimate of η. None of these variables need
be scalar; in particular, some components of x may be manipulable and some not. As such,
the functional form of the allocation rule need not have any easily interpreted coefficient
measuring how “flat” or “steep” it is with respect to x.
To formalize our proposal—estimation with noise—let a data set be a joint distribution
over (x, η). Let ML be an estimation procedure (e.g., a machine learning algorithm) that
takes as input an observable x and a data set d, and then outputs an allocation y. We
interpret ML(x; d) as first estimating η from x after being fit to the training data d, and
then outputting the designer’s preferred allocation given x and the estimate of η.
Estimation with noise. Recall the classical econometric result that measurement error
on an independent variable leads to attenuation bias, i.e., to an estimated coefficient in a
linear regression that is biased towards zero. Applying this concept, here is one approach
for generating the optimal policy of Sections 2–3, in which a one unit increase in x leads to
a β∗ increase in y. First gather training data set d˜ from some linear policy Y˜ (x) = β0 + βx,
where we take the coefficient β such that we expect the best response βˆ(β) to be above β∗.
For instance, we might start from a fixed-point policy β = βfp or (if ρ ≥ 0) from a constant
policy with β = 0. Then add noise to the measurements of x in the data set d˜ to generate
a new data set d′. For instance, replace each data point (xi, ηi) in d˜ with data point (x′i, ηi)
in d′, where the new regressor x′ is defined as x′i = xi + c + εi for c ∈ R and εi ∼ N (0, σ2ε).
When we linearly regress η on x′ in the data set d′, attenuation bias establishes that we find
a smaller coefficient than βˆ(β): increasing the variance of the noise σ2ε from 0 to infinity
reduces the estimated coefficient of η on x′ from βˆ(β) to 0. For an appropriate level of noise,
we hit the optimal coefficient β∗. Finally the constant c, added to or subtracted from all
points x′, can be adjusted so that the average allocation is equal to µη and thus the constant
term in the regression is optimal.
We can generalize this estimation with noise to arbitrary estimation procedures on arbi-
trary data sets. Start with the training data set d˜ induced by some original policy Y˜ . To
generate the new data set d′, add noise—perhaps with nonzero mean—to any manipulable
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components of x to get x′, while keeping η unchanged.15 Now define the estimation with
noise policy Y ews as
Y ews(x) = ML(x; d′).
Crucially, when determining the allocation for an agent with observable x, we do not add
noise to this agent’s x. The noise is only added to the data set on which the algorithm is
trained.16 In other words, Y ews sets each agent’s allocation based on an estimate of η, where
η is estimated using artificially noised up data. The logic of attenuation bias suggests that
Y ews is in some sense “flatter” with respect to the manipulable components of x, or “puts less
weight” on those components, relative to the best response policy that does not add noise.
We hope future research will explore this proposal systematically and study its benefits
in improving information from manipulable data in complex environments.
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Appendices
A. Proofs
A.1. Preliminary Results
Proposition A.1. There exists βfp > 0 satisfying βˆ(βfp) = βfp. If ρ ≥ 0 there is only one
βfp ≥ 0, and it satisfies βfp ∈ (0, 1).
That there is only one positive fixed point under nonnegative correlation has been noted
in different form in Frankel and Kartik (2019, Proposition 4).
Proof. For β ≥ 0, Equation 5 can be rewritten as the cubic equation
m2σ2γβ
3 + 2mρσησγβ
2 + (σ2η −mρσησγ)β − σ2η = 0. (A.1)
The left-hand side of (A.1) is continuous, negative at β = 0 and tends to ∞ as β → ∞.
There is a positive solution to (A.1) by the intermediate value theorem.
For the second statement of the proposition, differentiate βˆ(·) from Equation 5 to obtain
βˆ′(β) = −mσησγ(2βmσησγ + ρσ
2
η + ρβ
2m2σ2γ)
(σ2η + 2βmρσησγ + β
2m2σ2γ)
2
.
When ρ ≥ 0, this derivative is negative for all β > 0. The result follows from the fact that
βˆ(0) = 1 and, when ρ ≥ 0, βˆ(1) < 1. Q.E.D.
In subsequent proofs, we will appeal to the following standard fact concerning monotone
comparative statics.
Fact 1. Let T ⊆ R, Z ⊆ R be open, and f : Z × T → R be continuously differentiable in z
with for all t ∈ T , arg minz∈Z f(z, t) 6= ∅. Define M(t) ≡ arg minz∈Z f(z, t). For any t ∈ T
and t ∈ T with t > t, it holds that:
1. If fz(z, t) > fz(z, t) for all z ∈ Z, then for any m ∈ M(t) and any m ∈ M(t) it holds
that m < m.
Proof: For any zˆ > m,
f(zˆ, t)− f(m, t) =
∫ zˆ
m
fz(z, t)dz >
∫ zˆ
m
fz(z, t)dz = f(zˆ, t)− f(m, t) ≥ 0.
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Hence m ≤ m. The inequality must be strict because otherwise the first-order condi-
tions yield 0 = fz(m, t) = fz(m, t) > fz(m, t) = 0.
2. If fz(z, t) < fz(z, t) for all z ∈ Z, then for any m ∈ M(t) and any m ∈ M(t) it holds
that m > m. (We omit a proof, as it is analogous to that above.)
A.2. Proof of Proposition 1
Recall from Subsection 2.2 that (β∗, β∗0) solves
min
(β,β0)∈R2
E[(mβ2γ + β0 − (1− β)η)2].
The first-order condition with respect to β0 implies
β∗0 = E[(1− β)η −mβ2γ] = (1− β)µη −mβ2µγ.
Substituting β∗0 back into the objective, the designer chooses β to minimize
E[(mβ2(γ − µγ)− (1− β)(η − µη))2]
=(1− β)2σ2η +m2β4σ2γ − 2(1− β)mβ2Cov(η, γ)
=(1− β)2σ2η +m2β4σ2γ − 2(1− β)mβ2ρσησγ
=σ2η
[(
(1− β)− kβ2)2 + 2(1− ρ)β2(1− β)k] ,
where
k ≡ mσγ/ση > 0.
Equivalently, for any parameters k > 0 and ρ ∈ (−1, 1), the designer chooses β to minimize
L(β, k, ρ) ≡ (kβ2 + β − 1)2 + 2(1− ρ)β2(1− β)k. (A.2)
Differentiating,
Lβ(β, k, ρ) = −2(1− β) + 4k2β3 + 2ρkβ(3β − 2). (A.3)
Note that Lβ(0, k, ρ) < 0. This means the designer gains a first-order benefit from
putting at least some weight on the agent’s action, i.e., increasing β from zero. Further-
more, Lβ(β, k, ρ)→∞ as β →∞.
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Proposition 1 is implied by Lemma 1 and the following result. We will abuse notation
hereafter and drop the arguments k and ρ from L(·) when those parameters are being held
fixed. So, for example, L(β) means that both k and ρ are fixed.
Lemma A.1. There exists β∗ ∈ (0, 2) such that:
1. The loss function L(β) from (A.2) is uniquely minimized over β ∈ R at β∗.
2. β∗ = minβ≥0{β : L′(β) ≥ 0}.
3. L′′(β∗) > 0.
Proof. The proof has a few steps below. Steps 1–3 are building blocks to Step 4, which
establishes that all minimizers of L(β) are in (0, 2). Step 5 then establishes there is in fact
a unique minimizer, and it has the requisite properties. It is useful in this proof to extend
the domain of the function L defined in (A.2) to include ρ = −1 and ρ = 1.
Step 1: We begin by establishing some properties of L(β, ρ = 1). Simplifying (A.2),
L(β, ρ = 1) =
(
kβ2 + β − 1)2
is the square of a quadratic function. The quadratic function kβ2 + β − 1 is minimized at
β = βm ≡ −1/(2k) < 0, (A.4)
and the function has two roots, one of which is negative and the other is
β = β ≡ −1 +
√
1 + 4k
2k
∈ (0, 2).
So L(·, ρ = 1) is minimized at β, and there is no other nonnegative minimizer. Moreover,
L(·, ρ = 1) is strictly quasiconvex on (−∞, βm], strictly decreasing on [βm, β], and strictly
increasing on [β,∞). Still further, L(·, ρ = 1) is symmetric around βm: for any x ∈ R,
L(βm + x, ρ = 1) = L(βm − x, ρ = 1).
Step 2: We claim that for any β < 0 and ρ < 1, there is β˜ ≥ 0 such that L(β˜) < L(β).
Since L′(0) < 0—and hence L(β) is not minimized at β = 0—it follows that for ρ < 1,
arg minL(β, ρ) ⊂ R++.
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To prove the claim, we first establish that for any x > 0 and β = βm − x (where βm is
defined in (A.4)), the symmetric point βm +x has a lower loss when ρ < 1; note that βm +x
may also be negative. The argument is as follows:
L(βm − x, ρ)− L(βm + x, ρ) = L(βm − x, ρ = 1) + 2(1− ρ)(βm − x)2(1− βm + x)k
− [L(βm + x, ρ = 1) + 2(1− ρ)(βm + x)2(1− βm − x)k]
= 2(1− ρ)k [(βm − x)2(1− βm + x)− (βm + x)2(1− βm − x)]
= 4(1− ρ)kx (βm(3βm − 2) + x2)
≥ 0,
where the first equality is from the definition of L(·) in Equation A.2, the second is because
Step 1 established that L(βm + x, ρ = 1) = L(βm − x, ρ = 1), the third equality is algebraic
simplification, and the inequality is because βm < 0, x > 0, and ρ < 1.
It now suffices to establish that L(0, ρ) < L(β, ρ) for all β ∈ [βm, 0). Differentiating (A.3)
yields Lβρ(β, ρ) = 2kβ(3β − 2) > 0 when β < 0. Hence for β ∈ [βm, 0), L(0, ρ)− L(β, ρ) ≤
L(0, ρ = 1)− L(β, ρ = 1) < 0, where the strict inequality is from Step 1.
Step 3: arg minβ L(β, ρ = −1) ∩ (0, 2] 6= ∅.
To prove this, begin by simplifying (A.2) to get
L(β, ρ = −1) = (kβ2 − β + 1)2 .
The quadratic function kβ2 − β + 1 is strictly convex in β and is minimized at β = 1/(2k);
moreover, if k ≥ 1/4 then the function is nonnegative for all β, and otherwise it is equal to
zero at β = 1±
√
1−4k
2k
. It follows that if k ≥ 1/4, arg minL(β, ρ = −1) = {1/(2k)}, and hence
the unique minimizer is in (0, 2]. If k < 1/4, arg minL(β, ρ = −1) = {1−
√
1−4k
2k
, 1+
√
1−4k
2k
},
and routine algebra verifies that the smaller minimizer, 1−
√
1−4k
2k
, is in (0, 2).
Step 4: For ρ ∈ (−1, 1), arg minβ L(β, ρ) ⊂ (0, 2).
This follows from a standard monotone comparative statics argument (see Fact 1): since
Lβρ(β, ρ) = 2kβ(3β − 2) > 0 when β > 2/3, on the domain (2/3,∞) every minimizer of
L(·, ρ) when ρ > −1 is smaller than every minimizer of L(·, ρ = −1). Step 3 then implies
that all minimizers for ρ > −1 are less than 2; Step 2 established that when ρ < 1, all
minimizers are larger than 0.
Step 5: Finally, we claim that for ρ ∈ (−1, 1), L′(β) has only one root in (0, 2); moreover,
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L′′(β) > 0 at that root. The lemma then follows because L′(β) is continuous and L′(0) < 0.
To prove the claim, we begin by observing from Equation A.3 that L′(β) is cubic func-
tion that is initially strictly concave and then strictly convex, with an inflection point at
β = −ρ/(2k). For the rest of the proof, arguments of L′ or L′′ refer to values of β.
1. If ρ ≥ 0, then the inflection point is negative, and thus L′ is strictly convex on β > 0.
Since L′(0) < 0, L′ has only one positive root, and L′′ > 0 at that root.
2. Now consider ρ ∈ (−1, 0). L′′ is minimized at the inflection point of L′. Differentiating
Equation A.3, it holds at the inflection point that
L′′
(−ρ
2k
)
= 2 + 12k2
(−ρ
2k
)2
+ 4ρk
(
3
(−ρ
2k
)
− 1
)
= 2− 3ρ2 − 4kρ.
If this expression is positive, then L′′(β) > 0 for all β, i.e., L′ is strictly increasing and
hence has a unique root.
So suppose instead that 2− 3ρ2 − 4kρ ≤ 0. Equivalently, since ρ < 0, suppose that
k ≤ 2− 3ρ
2
4ρ
.
The right-hand side of this inequality is less than −ρ/4 because ρ ∈ (−1, 0), and hence
k < −ρ/4. Consequently, the inflection point, β = −ρ/(2k), is larger than 2, and
therefore L′(β) is concave over β ∈ (0, 2). Moreover, recall that L′(0) < 0, and also
observe that L′(2) = 32k2 + 16kρ + 2 > 0.17 It follows that L′ has only one root on
(0, 2), and L′′ > 0 at that root. Q.E.D.
A.3. Proof of Lemma 1
It holds that
E[(ηˆβ(x)− η)2] = σ2η
(
1−R2ηx
)
= σ2η − (βˆ(β))2Var(x),
where the first equality was noted in the main text after Equation 6, and the second equality
holds because R2ηx = (Cov(x, η))2/(Var(η)Var(x)) and βˆ(β) = Cov(x, η)/Var(x). Recall that
Var(x) > 0 because of our maintained assumption that ρ ∈ (−1, 1).
17To see that L′(2) > 0, observe that the quadratic expression 32k2 + 16kρ+ 2 is minimized over choice
of k at k = −ρ/4, at which point its value is −2ρ2 + 2. Since k < −ρ/4, we have L′(2) > −2ρ2 + 2, and this
right-hand side is larger than 0 because ρ ∈ (−1, 0).
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We also have
E[(Y (x)− ηˆβ(x))2] = E[(βx+ β0 − βˆ(β)x− βˆ0(β))2] from definitions
= E
[(
(β − βˆ(β))(x− E[x])
)2]
= (β − βˆ(β))2Var(x),
where the second line is because the choice of β0 and βˆ(β) are such that βE[x] + β0 = µη =
βˆ(β)E[x] + βˆ0(β) (the second equality here is standard; for the first, see the beginning of the
proof of Proposition 1) and hence β0 − βˆ0(β) = (βˆ(β)− β)E[x].
Substituting these formulae into Equation 6 yields
L(β) = σ2η − (βˆ(β))2Var(x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Info loss
+ (β − βˆ(β))2Var(x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Misallocation loss
.
Differentiating,
L′(β) =
Marginal change in info loss︷ ︸︸ ︷(
−2βˆ(β)βˆ′(β)Var(x)− (βˆ(β))2 d
dβ
Var(x)
)
+
(
−2(β − βˆ(β))βˆ′(β)Var(x) + (β − βˆ(β))2 d
dβ
Var(x)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Marginal change in misallocation loss
.
When β = βfp = βˆ(βfp), the marginal change in misallocation loss is evidently zero (intu-
itively because the misallocation loss is minimized at β = βfp). Thus,
L′(βfp) = −2βfpβˆ′(βfp)Var(x)− (βfp)2 d
dβ
Var(x).
Using Var(x) = Cov(x, β)/βˆ(β), Cov(x, β) = σ2η+mρσησγβ, Var(x) = Cov(x, β)+mρσησγβ+
m2σ2γβ
2, and βfp = βˆ(βfp), some algebra then yields18
L′(βfp) = 2m
2
Var(x)
(βfp)2σ2ησ
2
γ(1− ρ2).
Since βfp 6= 0 (as βˆ(0) = 1 from Equation 5) and ρ ∈ (−1, 1), it follows that L′(βfp) > 0.
18Letting C and V be shorthand for Cov(x, β) and Var(x) respectively, a prime denote the derivative
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A.4. Proof of Proposition 2
The proof is via the following claims. Applying Lemma A.1, we without loss restrict
attention to β ∈ (0, 2) throughout this subsection.
Claim A.1. β∗ is continuously differentiable in ρ and k.
Proof. Lemma A.1 established that sign[L′′(β∗)] > 0. Thus, the implicit function theorem
guarantees the existence of dβ
∗
dk
= −Lβk
Lββ
and dβ
∗
dρ
= −Lβρ
Lββ
. Q.E.D.
Claim A.2. If k > 3/4 then β∗ < 2/3 and is strictly increasing in ρ. If k < 3/4 then
β∗ > 2/3 and is strictly decreasing in ρ. If k = 3/4 then β∗ = 2/3 independent of ρ.
Proof. From Equation A.3 compute the cross partial
Lβρ = 2kβ(3β − 2).
Hence Lβρ < 0 when β < 2/3, while Lβρ > 0 when β > 2/3. Moreover, it follows from
Equation A.3 that when β = 2/3, sign[Lβ] = sign[k − 3/4] independent of ρ.
1. Consider k = 3/4. Routine algebra verifies that Lβ is strictly increasing in β, and
hence Lβ = 0 =⇒ β = 2/3, i.e., β∗ = 2/3 independent of ρ.
2. Consider k > 3/4. Since Lβ > 0 when β = 2/3, it follows that β∗ < 2/3. (Recall
Lβ < 0 when β = 0, and Lemma A.1 implies that β∗ = min{β > 0 : Lβ = 0}.) Since
Lβρ < 0 on the domain β < 2/3, monotone comparative statics imply β∗ is strictly
increasing in ρ.
3. Consider k < 3/4. For ρ = 0, we have Lβk = 8kβ3 > 0 and hence β∗ > 2/3 using
β∗ = 2/3 when k = 3/4 and monotone comparative statics. It follows that β∗ > 2/3
for all ρ because β∗ is continuous in ρ and Lβ < 0 when β = 2/3 whereas Lβ = 0 when
with respect to β, suppressing arguments, evaluating all functions at βfp, and using the properties noted:
L′ = −2βfpβˆ′V − (C/V )2V ′ = −2Cβˆ′ − (C/V )2V ′ = (−2CV C ′ + C2V ′)/V 2
= (C/V 2)
[−2CC ′(C +mρσησγβfp +m2σ2γ(βfp)2) + C2(2C ′ + 2m2σ2γβfp)]
= (2βfpC/V 2)
[−C ′(mρσησγ +m2σ2γβfp) + Cm2σ2γ]
= (2βfpC/V 2)
[−(mρσησγ)2 − (mρσησγ)m2σ2γβfp) + (σ2η +mρσησγβfp)m2σ2γ]
= (2βfpC/V 2)m2(σησγ)
2(1− ρ2) = 2(βfp)2(1/V )m2σ2ησ2γ(1− ρ2).
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β = β∗. Since Lβρ > 0 on the domain β > 2/3, monotone comparative statics imply
β∗ is strictly decreasing in ρ. Q.E.D.
Claim A.3. As k →∞, β∗ → 0; as k → 0, β∗ → 1. If ρ ≥ 0 then β∗ is strictly decreasing
in k. If ρ < 0 then β∗ is strictly quasi-concave in k, attaining a maximum at some point.
Proof. The first statement about limits is evident from inspecting Equation A.3. For the
comparative statics, compute the cross partials
Lβk = 8kβ
3 + 2ρβ(3β − 2) and Lβkk = 8β3 > 0.
Since dβ
∗
dk
= −Lβk
Lββ
and, from Lemma A.1, Lββ > 0 at β = β∗, the sign of dβ
∗
dk
is the sign of
−Lβk. Using β∗ → 1 as k → 0, we see that for small k and at β = β∗, Lβk is larger than but
arbitrarily close to 2ρ.
1. It follows that Lβk > 0 for all k and β = β∗ when ρ ≥ 0. That is, dβ∗dk < 0 when ρ ≥ 0.
2. Consider ρ < 0. Plainly Lβk < 0 for small k and β = β∗, while for some k it becomes
positive (since β∗ → 0 as k →∞). Since Lβk is strictly increasing in k, it follows that
dβ∗
dk
is strictly decreasing in k, initially positive and eventually negative. Q.E.D.
Claim A.4. Assume ρ = 0. There is a unique βfp, which is positive. Both βfp and β∗/βfp
are strictly decreasing in k. Moreover, β∗/βfp → 1 as k →∞ and β∗/βfp → 3√1/2 as k → 0.
Proof. Assume ρ = 0. Equation A.1 simplifies to
k2(βfp)3 + βfp − 1 = 0, (A.5)
which has a unique solution, with βfp ∈ (0, 1) strictly decreasing in k with range (0, 1).
The first order condition for β∗ simplifies to
2k2(β∗)3 + β∗ − 1 = 0, (A.6)
which has a unique solution, also in (0, 1) and strictly decreasing in k with range (0, 1).
Hence, β∗/βfp → 1 as k → 0. Moroever, Equation A.5 and Equation A.6 imply that as
k →∞, k2(βfp)3 → 1 and 2k2(β∗)3 → 1, and hence (β∗/βfp)→ 3√1/2.
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It remains to prove that β∗/βfp is strictly decreasing in k. Applying the implicit function
theorem to Equation A.5 and Equation A.6 (which is indeed valid) and doing some algebra,
dβ∗
dk
= − 4k(β
∗)3
6k2(β∗)2 + 1
,
dβfp
dk
= − 2k(β
fp)3
3k2(βfp)2 + 1
.
β∗/βfp is strictly decreasing in k if and only if βfp dβ
∗
dk
− β∗ dβfp
dk
< 0. Substituting in the
formulae above, this inequality is equivalent to
2k(βfp)3β∗
3k2(βfp)2 + 1
<
4k(β∗)3βfp
6k2(β∗)2 + 1
⇐⇒ (6k2(β∗)2 + 1) (βfp)2 < (3k2(βfp)2 + 1) 2(β∗)2
⇐⇒ βfp < β∗
√
2.
Plainly, the last inequality holds as k → 0 because both βfp → 1 and β∗ → 1 as k → 0. By
continuity, we are done if there is no k at which βfp = β∗
√
2. Indeed there is not because
then Equation A.5 would become equivalent to
2k2(β∗)3 + β∗ − 1/
√
2 = 0,
contradicting Equation A.6. Q.E.D.
B. Alternative Model of Information Loss
Let the agent take action x ∈ {0, 1} with natural action η ∈ {0, 1}. The agent’s type
η is her private information, drawn with ex-ante probability pi ∈ (0, 1) that η = 1. After
observing x, the designer chooses allocation y ∈ R with payoff −(y − η)2. We assume, for
simplicity, that the agent of type η = 1 must choose x = 1.19 The payoff for type η = 0 is
y− cx, where c > 0 is a commonly known parameter. To streamline the analysis, we assume
c ∈ (0, pi).
A pure allocation rule or policy is Y : {0, 1} → R. Due to the designer’s quadratic loss
19Our main point goes through so long as action x = 1 is no more costly than x = 0 for type η = 1, as
this will ensure it is optimal for type η = 1 to choose x = 1.
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payoff, it is without loss to focus on pure policies. Given a policy Y , let ∆ ≡ Y (1)−Y (0) be
the difference in allocations across the two actions of the agent. We focus, without loss, on
policies with ∆ ≥ 0. A policy with a smaller ∆ is a “flatter” policy, i.e., it is less sensitive to
the agent’s action. The naive policy Y n sets Y n(1) = 1 and Y n(0) = 0, corresponding to a
naive allocation difference of ∆n = 1. Let ∆fp and ∆∗ denote the corresponding differences
from fixed point and commitment policies.
B.1. Naive Policy
Take any policy with ∆ = 1. Since we assume c < pi < 1, even the agent with η = 0
will then choose x = 1. So welfare—the designer’s ex-ante expected payoff—from the naive
policy is
−pi(0− 0)2 − (1− pi)(1− 0)2 = −(1− pi).
B.2. Fixed Point
At a Bayesian Nash equilibrium (of either the simultaneous move game, or when the agent
moves first), Y (x) = E[η|x] for any x on the equilibrium path. If x = 0 is on the equilibrium
path, Y (0) = 0 because type η = 1 does not play x = 0.
There is a fully-pooling equilibrium with both types playing x = 1: the designer plays
Y (1) = pi and Y (0) = 0, and it is optimal for type η = 0 to play x = 1 because c < pi. The
corresponding welfare is
−pi(pi − 1)2 − (1− pi)(pi − 0)2 = −pi(1− pi).
There is no equilibrium in which the agent of type η = 0 puts positive probability on
action x = 0, because that would imply Y (1) > pi and Y (1) = 0, against which the agent’s
unique best response is to play x = 1.
Therefore, we have identified the (essentially unique, up to the off-path allocation following
x = 0) fixed point policy: Y fp(1) = pi, Y fp(0) = 0, and therefore ∆fp = pi. The agent pools
on x = 1, and welfare is −pi(1− pi).20 This welfare is larger than that of the naive policy.
20The choice of Y fp(0) = 0 can be justified from the perspective of the agent “trembling”. In particular,
in the signaling game where the agent moves before the designer, any sequential equilibrium (Kreps and
Wilson, 1982) has Y (0) = 0, as only type η = 0 can play x = 0. But note that no matter how Y (0) is
specified, it must hold in a fixed point that ∆ ≤ c; otherwise the agent will not pool at x = 1.
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B.3. Commitment
Now suppose the designer’s commits to a policy before the agent moves. From the earlier
analysis, if ∆ > c the agent will pool at x = 1 and so an optimal such policy is the fixed
point policy Y fp. For any ∆ < c, there is full separation: the agent’s best response is x = η.
Indeed, full separation is also a best response for the agent when ∆ = c. Given that the
designer wants to match the agent’s type, it follows that the optimal way to induce full
separation is to set ∆ = c (or ∆ = c−), i.e., have Y ∗(1) = Y ∗(0) + c.
At such an optimum, quadratic loss utility implies that the designer sets an average action
of (1− pi)Y ∗(0) + piY ∗(1) equal to E[η] = pi. Plugging in Y ∗(1) = Y ∗(0) + c yields
(1− pi)Y ∗(0) + pi(Y ∗(0) + c) = pi,
and hence the solution
Y ∗(0) = pi(1− c), Y ∗(1) = pi(1− c) + c.
The corresponding welfare is
−(1− pi)(pi(1− c)− 0)2 − pi(pi(1− c) + c− 1)2 = −(1− c)2(1− pi)pi.
This welfare is larger than that under the fixed point. Moreover, the optimal policy has
∆∗ = c while the fixed point has ∆fp = pi and the naive policy has ∆n = 1. Thus the optimal
policy is flatter than the fixed point, which in turn is flatter than the naive policy:
∆∗ < ∆fp < ∆n.
Note that the designer obtains no benefit from reducing ∆ from ∆fp = pi until reaching
∆∗ = c; this is an artifact of the assumption that there is no heterogeneity in the manipulation
cost c. In a model with such heterogeneity, there would be a more continuous benefit of
reducing ∆ from the fixed point.
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